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ABSTRACT
As the Internet grows, traffic engineering has become a
widely-used technique to control the flow of packets. For
the inter-domain routing, traffic engineering relies on con-
figurations of the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). While
it is recognized that the misconfiguration of BGP can cause
negative effects on the Internet, we consider attack methods
that disable traffic engineering regardless of the correctness
of configurations. We focus on the redirection of traffic as
our attack objective, and present attack scenarios on some
dominant sample network topologies to achieve this objec-
tive. We also evaluate and validate these attacks using two
different discrete-event simulators, one that models BGP
behavior on a network, and another that emulates it using
direct-execution of working BGP code.
1 INTRODUCTION
The Internet is a very large-scale decentralized network. A
packet sent from one computer to another may cross multiple
networking administrative domains, so-called Autonomous
Systems (AS). Internet routing infrastructure includes two
different systems - an intra-domain routing system which
operates within an Autonomous System and an inter-domain
routing system, which provides connectivity between ASes.
An AS routes traffic within its infrastructure any way it likes;
all of the Internet’s ASes coordinate the inter-domain routing
by running the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) protocol
(van Beijnum 2002) on routers that connect ASes. BGP
computes routes (i.e., sequences of ASes to visit) between
every AS and every IP address.
Large ASes associated with telecommunications com-
panies make a business of carrying inter-domain Internet
traffic. Many ASes do not, typically those associated with
a comparatively small organization (like a University, or
large non-communication’s company). Such ASes connect
to the Internet through another AS known as a provider.
Some actually connect through multiple providers, a prac-
tice known as multi-homing. Through each such provider a
multi-homed AS causes the creation of a different connec-
tion between it and every Internet destination. As a result,
each multi-homed AS can elect to use whichever of these
routes looks most attractive, based on its own definition
of “best route” such as shortest hops, shortest latency, and
etc. Activities that decide the best route of the AS’s own
definition and control the traffic to take certain routes are
called traffic engineering. Traffic engineering can be done
in many ways, but for the inter-domain routings, it solely
relies on the configuration of BGP. Several policy-based
inter-domain routing techniques have been developed to di-
rect the traffic to a certain path that a network administrator
specifies. However, slight mis-configurations or attacks that
are designed to exploit vulnerabilities of BGP can cause
different types of damage to the Internet. In fact, one of the
biggest challenges faced by inter-domain routing technol-
ogy is that it is vulnerable to mis-configurations and attacks
that cause abnormal packet flows. It has been shown that
mis-configurations often happen in practice, and that they
can cause reachability or BGP convergence problems. For
example, a well-known incident involving AS 7007 caused
a crash of backbone networks throughout North America
and Europe for several hours, by announcing that AS 7007
itself is the origin of the best path to almost the whole
Internet (Bono 1997). Previous research also indicates that
BGP is vulnerable to attacks, and thus can be exploited to
compromise the inter-domain routing systems. The result
of such attacks may be more severe than those of mis-
configurations because such attacks will intentionally affect
a larger number of hosts.
In this paper, we focus especially on vulnerabilities of
traffic engineering under BGP, by exploring how attack-
ers may be able to disable or disrupt inter-domain traffic
engineering. The objective of this paper is to show that
multiple colluding attackers can redirect the victim’s traffic
(both incoming and outgoing) as they like, regardless of
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victim’s policy settings. By studying the actual Internet AS
topology, we also show that local topologies vulnerable to
these attacks are pervasive.
The rest of this paper organized as follows. We start by
providing background information in Section 2. Section 3
describes our attack method. We analyze the BGP routing
table and present the result of analysis in Section 4. Section 5
uses two types of simulators to demonstrate the effect of these
attacks. One (using SSFNet) models BGP, and analyzes the
impact on throughput that an attack may have. The other
(using BGP++) embeds real BGP code into a simulated
network environment. Playing the attacks in BGP++ with
subsequent examination of the forwarding tables validates
the possibility of these attacks. We conclude in Section 6.
2 Related Work
BGP attacks have recently started to gain at-
tention from the network research community.
Nordstrom and Dovrolis (2004) stated that BGP is
vulnerable to a number of relatively easy attacks once
one or more BGP speakers are compromised. It classified
the attack objectives into the following four categories:
black-holing, redirection, subversion and instability. It also
proposed several attack methods in a concrete way, and
extensively handled the major proposed countermeasures
for BGP security.
Routing Protocol Security (rpsec) has also de-
veloped BGP attack trees in its Internet draft
(Convery, Cook, and Franz 2004) . They defined a few
atomic goals to be achieved throughout the attacks, such as
compromising MD5 authentication, establishing unautho-
rized BGP session with peer, originating unauthorized prefix
into peer route table, etc. Furthermore, they constructed
an attack tree for each atomic goal, so that each tree could
describe comprehensive ways to achieve the goal. Although
they tried to show that many different attacks exist, they
did not discuss each attack in depth.
In addition to intentional attacks,
Mahajan, Wetherall, and Anderson (2002) studied the
effect of misconfigurations of BGP. They focused on two
types of mis-configurations: origin mis-configurations
(where an AS accidentally injects a prefix into the global
BGP table) and export mis-configurations (where an
AS exports a route in violation of its policies). By
examining the streams of real BGP updates, they showed
that these configuration errors are pervasive, and that they
substantially increase the update load on routers.
3 BACKGROUND
3.1 Overview of BGP4 - The Border Gateway Protocol
BGP is the de facto standard protocol for the inter-domain
routing. It specifies how each packet from one AS finds
its way to another AS. A unit of “domain” in BGP is an
IP prefix, each prefix is bound to some AS (and if the
AS intends for other ASes to be able to address to it, the
AS “announces" the prefix using BGP). Each AS has one
or more external routers called BGP speakers that execute
some implementation of the BGP specifications. When a
packet exits an AS through a BGP speaker, that speaker
looks at the packet’s destination address, and looks up in a
forwarding table the port through which it needs to push the
packet along. In principle, every BGP speaker must be able
to forward a packet addressed to any IP prefix announced
anywhere in the Internet. Toward that goal, execution of
the BGP protocol builds a speaker’s forwarding tables. An
entry in the forwarding table contains a complete route to
a destination prefix. Given a packet’s IP address, a router
searches for the matching prefix and forwards the packet
accordingly. The forwarding table of a BGP speaker inside
an AS is constructed by receiving UPDATE messages from
BGP speakers of other ASes. Each router can announce a
new route or withdraw an existing route through sending an
UPDATE message. KEEPALIVE messages are exchanged
between BGP speakers to make sure they are reachable. A
certain timeout value is used to send these messages.
Traffic engineering in BGP protocol takes place when
a BGP speaker receives two or more routes to a same des-
tination IP prefix. A BGP speaker chooses one route based
on its configuration. We will discuss traffic engineering
further in Section 3.1.2 and Section 4.1
3.1.1 Peering Relationships
Two ASes are said to have a peering relationship when each
of them has a BGP speaker, and the two BGP speakers
communicate with each other. A peering relationship can
be classified into one of the following three categories
(Gao 2000).
• customer/provider : AS u is a provider of AS v iff
u transits traffic for v (a customer) and v does not
transit traffic for u.
• peer/peer : AS u and v have a peering relationship
iff neither u nor v transits traffic for each other.
• sibling/sibling : AS u and v have a sibling rela-
tionship iff both u and v transit traffic for each
other.
The customer/provider relationship is a commercial
one based on inequality of size and capability. The sib-
Kim, Ko, Nicol, Dimitropoulos and Riley
ling/sibling relationship is one based on equality—one sib-
ling agrees to carry traffic it has no direct interest in,
received from another sibling. It is a sort of symmetric cus-
tomer/provider relationship, but without one sibling paying
another. The peer/peer relationship is one of convenience.
One peer announces its own prefixes to another peer, in
order to allow the second peer to directly send traffic it
originates to the first.
3.1.2 Path Selection Mechanisms
When a BGP speaker receives two or more announcements
describing how to reach a given IP prefix, it has to choose
one among them. For this purpose, BGP has a path selec-
tion mechanism. That mechanism is an ordered sequence
of priority comparisons. The first comparison in the se-
quence that indicates a preference for one announcement
over another ends up defining the choice. The following
sequence of comparison keys are from a CISCO router, but
routers from other vendors take similar steps. This list is
actually incomplete; the first four steps, shown below, are
the only ones relevant to the attacks we consider.
1. The path with the largest “weight" (a Cisco-specific
parameter, local to the router on which it’s config-
ured.)
2. The path with the largest local preference. A lo-
cal preference indicates the preferred path. Unlike
the weight attribute which is only relevant to the
local router, the local preference is shared among
the external routers in a same AS. It is impor-
tant to remember that a local preference is defined
by the AS making the selection; typically the lo-
cal preference is established at configuration, an
announcement’s local preference is the local pref-
erence value assigned to the AS that announced
it.
3. The path that was locally originated.
4. The path with the shortest number of hops (i.e. the
shortest AS path).
4 ATTACK MODEL
We start this section by explaining traffic engineering. After-
words, we describe the goal and mechanisms of our attacks.
Note that we assume that an attacker has compromised and
taken control of one or more BGP routers. A BGP router is
just another device on the Internet, accessible like another
device on the Internet, albeit with an operating system dif-
ferent than most. Nevertheless attackers can gain access
to the BGP machines through mechanisms like password
spoofing, brute force password scanning or default pass-
word detection, because a large number of routers simply
use the default passwords. Many routers also use widely-
used interfaces like telnet and SSH, so they share all known
vulnerabilities of the interfaces (Subramanian et al. 2004).
4.1 Traffic Engineering
This subsection gives an overview of traffic engineer-
ing in practice, mostly described in (van Beijnum 2002,
Quoitin et al. 2003).
4.1.1 Incoming Traffic
A network administrator can see how much traffic his routes
attract over the different connections to the global Internet.
While the traffic may be distributed equally over existing
connections (depending on which prefixes are announced
through them), a problem can occur if one connection attracts
more traffic than it can handle or the connection capacities
are significantly different. In this case, an administrator
can encourage upstream ASes to select a different connec-
tion, by re-announcing prefixes over the first connection
but with the AS identity prepended to the path more than
once. For upstream ASes where the two paths to the prefix
are equivalent in preference using comparisons 1-3 above,
comparison 4 (shortest path) may now settle the issue in
favor of the targeted connection. This technique is known
as AS path padding.
4.1.2 Outgoing Traffic
The most effective way to influence the BGP path selection
process is to adjust the local preference. This can be very
effective when a certain route is always better than the other
routes. For example, if routes over the main connection are
preferred over routes that use a slower backup connection,
higher local preference can be assigned to routes received
from a BGP neighbor linked with the main connection.
Since local preference is defined by the AS that uses
it, attacks on local preference must either be on that AS
itself, or to cause elimination of connections to ASes having
more advantageous local preference than the connection the
attack wishes to have used.
4.2 Attack Description
The objective of our attacks is to redirect the victim AS’s
traffic load to the path specified by the attackers, regardless
of the victim’s BGP configuration. Since an AS normally
prefers the high-bandwidth connection, redirecting the traffic
to the low-bandwidth connection can decrease the network
performance (decreasing the capability of the victim AS).
It may also be that an AS multi-homes to provide itself an
expensive but infrequently used backup connection, so an
attack that forces an AS to use the expensive connection
and suffer economically. Another motivation for redirecting
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traffic is to allow one to eavesdrop or modify the messages
sent to the victim; the packets are still forward to the their
original destination, making the attack difficult to detect.
4.2.1 Incoming Traffic
Assume that an attacker has compromised a neighboring
AS of the victim. If the attacker wishes to intercept traffic
destined for the victim, but finds that traffic to the victim is
routed through a different AS, it can immediately announce
that it is the origin of the best path to the victim (one way
of which is described below). Then the ASes connected to
the attacker will send their traffic through the attacker, and
the usage of the link between the attacker and the victim
will increase.
Figure 1 shows the attack with a simple example topol-
ogy. AS 1 is the gateway AS that provides outside connec-
tions to the attacker, AS 2, and the victim. Assume that the
victim wants to force all incoming traffic to pass through
the normal link from AS 2; as we describe in Section 4.1.1,
this usually accomplished by the victim padding multiple
copies of its own id onto the path it announces. However, if
the attacker wants to force all incoming traffic to go through
its link (backup link in Figure 1), then it can engineer an
announcement that should be more attractive to AS 1 than
what AS 1 receives from AS 3, e.g., drop the padding on
the victim’s own announcement, or state that the attacker
is the victim itself. Assuming that comparison 1 (weight)
is equivalent, we see that comparison 2 (local preference)
might still cause AS 1 to choose to use AS 2. While this
is certainly possible, the customary use of local preference
is by a customer to select between providers, which is not
the case here. Therefore if comparison 2 does not resolve
the route selection, then the false announcements we named
will use rule 3 to resolve in favor of the false announce-
ment. Moreover, deceived ASes further propagate the false
announcements to other ASes.
This attack relies upon use of the shortest-path rule
to allow false announcements by the attacker to attract
inbound traffic for the victim. By this principle more
complex topologies might also be attacked. For example, if
the victim in Figure 1 homes with even more ASes that peer
only with provider AS 1, then as the attacker impersonates
the victim (in terms of AS identity and prefixes announced),
it will again intercept all of the victim’s traffic.
Another type of attack can intercept some (if not all)
of a victim’s inbound traffic, but in much more general
topologies. This is illustrated in Figure 2. The stub AS 8
that has a single upstream provider, AS 7, is the victim.
The compromised AS 4, which can reach the victim AS 8
along the path 5 7 8, sends an update to AS 1 announcing
that it originates one or more prefixes of the victim. AS
1 that receives the false update, runs the BGP decision









Figure 1: An Attack Scenario for Incoming Traffic
destined to AS 8. It is assumed that the new route is
preferred over the original route because of the shorter
AS-path. Subsequently, AS 1 further propagates the false
announcement resulting in more ASes shifting to the new
path. The selection of the fake path over the original path
depends on the length of the two paths and the configuration
of the routers. Typically, shorter AS-paths are selected,
although in some special cases administrator configuration
may impose higher local preference for certain types of
paths, e.g. paths through a cheaper neighbor, resulting in
a longer path being preferred. In this example, assuming
that shorter AS-paths are preferred, ASes 1, 2 and 3 switch
to the new spurious path.
This example suggests a general principle under which
an attacker can intercept a victim’s traffic, but still forwarded
that traffic to reach the victim after copying or modifying
it. Consider a graph where nodes represent ASes, and an
edge exists between customers and providers that peer, and
between siblings that peer. This graph fairly represents
possible paths, and BGP will select the shortest path, so
long as the “weight" comparison doesn’t matter, and local
preference definitions are limited to customer ASes selecting
providers.
Let Av be an intended victim router, Aa be an attacking
router, and At be the AS through which Aa normally routes
traffic toward Av (Figure 3). Define dt,v to be the shortest
number of hops in the graph from At to Av , and define
dt,a to be the shortest number of hops in the graph from
At to Aa on paths that do not use the Aa − At link.
If Aa makes announcements (to peers other than At ) that
indicate that Aa is within k hops of At , then all ASes whose
distance to Aa , plus k, is smaller their distance to Av in
the graph will be fooled into directing their traffic toward
the impersonator. However, Aa can still cause Av’s traffic













Figure 2: An Attack Scenario on More General Sample
to be delivered simply by forwarding it to At , provided
that At is not itself affected by Aa’s false announcements.
At is immune from the false announcement provided that
dt,a + k > dt,v . Parameter k here governs a sort of trade-
off—the smaller it is, the larger the set of ASes that may be
fooled, but the more stringent is the requirement on At that
permits traffic to be delivered to Av after being snooped.
In practice, a compromised router would identify potential
victims (and hence applicable ASes to play the role of At ),
try to determine dt,v , choose k = dt,v −dt,a , and craft false
announcements which claim that Aa is within k hops of
Av .
This attack can be viewed as a variation of the well-
known man in the middle (MITM) attack, in which players
areASs and messages are intercepted in one direction instead
of both directions. Furthermore, it is more powerful than
the MITM attack in the sense that it can affect traffic
not just between two players, e.g. Alice and Bob, but
between a number of sender ASes and one receiver AS,
where each of the involved ASes bears a large number of
end users. The impact of the false announcements made by
the compromised AS depends on the topological properties
of the compromised AS and the victim AS. Intuitively, if
the compromised AS is located near the core of the AS
topology it will affect more ASes. Also if the victim AS
is located at the periphery of the AS topology it is more
vulnerable to an attack.
4.2.2 Outgoing Traffic
Figure 4 illustrates a topology we use to discuss attacks on
a victim’s outbound traffic. Assume that the victim wants
to send its outgoing traffic through the normal link to AS








Figure 3: An Attack Scenario on Interception
of economic reasons or performance reasons. In this case,
what the victim usually does is to set the local preference of
the normal link larger than that of the backup link, so that
all outgoing traffic would go through the normal link as in
Section 4.1.2. Assume that there is an attacker who wants
to force all outgoing traffic of the victim to go through the
backup link. To achieve this goal, the attacker compromises
two BGP speakers: one in a neighboring AS, and the other
in a gateway AS. The attacker knows the AS path from
the neighboring AS, so it can withdraw all the other paths
from the gateway AS. Then the victim has no other choice
to select the route from a neighboring attacker and will
send its traffic to that route. Assume that attacker 1 has
compromised attacker 2 or an attacker has compromised
two BGP speakers, attacker 1 and attacker 2. The goal of
the attacker is to force all outgoing traffic from the victim
to go through the backup link. This can be easily achieved
by sending a withdrawal message from attacker 2 to AS 2,
stating that attacker 2 now no longer has any connection to
the Internet. AS 2 will send a withdrawal message to the
victim stating that it does not know any connection to the
Internet and the victim has to use the backup link.
4.2.3 Discussion
In Section 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, we show how an attacker can
completely control a victim’s traffic, on a small topology.
We explained how a slightly more complex topology is still
vulnerable to attacks on inbound traffic; however, the attack
described on outbound traffic requires a compromised router
for every link to the victim on which a withdrawal message
is to be generated. While these constraints are severe, it
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Figure 4: An Attack Scenario for Outgoing Traffic
turns out that these sub-topologies appear quite often in the
Internet, as we next see.
4.3 Topology Analysis
Since the attack scheme that we described in Section 4.2 is
topology-dependent, it is important to analyze the Internet
topology. However, it is impractical to analyze the whole
Internet topology at the level of individual devices. How-
ever there are fewer than 20,000 ASes, and so a study of AS
topology is quite feasible. A historical record of the Inter-
net’s AS topology is freely available on the Internet, through
the Route Views project (University of Oregon 2001). We
study the topology sampled on Nov. 19, 2003. This topol-
ogy has 16362 nodes, including 13752 “pure customers”
and 13 “pure providers”. By “pure customer”, we mean that
an AS which is only a customer to one or more ASes, but
not a provider, a peer, nor a sibling to other ASes. Similarly,
by “pure provider”, we mean that an AS which is only a
provider to one or more ASes, but not a customer of any
AS. A pure customer can have multiple providers; in our
topology, most of them are single- or multi-homed ASes (a
single-homed AS has only one provider and a multi-homed
AS has two providers). Specifically, 5573 pure customers
are single-homed and 6603 pure customers are multi-homed.
Roughly speaking, about a half of all pure customers are
multi-homed. In our analysis, we focus on multi-homed
ASes because they are the ones in the example topology in
Figure 1 and Figure 4.
In the topology that we use, there are 9810 occurrences
of the example topology. To get this result, we first take each
multi-homed pure customer, and see if the two providers of
the pure customer (there are exactly two providers) have a
common higher provider. For the sake of our discussion, we
call pure customers of the example topology as victims, two
providers of a victim as intermediate nodes, and common
higher providers as gateways since they provide a connection
to the rest of the Internet. Note that there is a possibility that
the two intermediate nodes have more than one common
gateways and that different victims share a common pair
of intermediate nodes. Thus, this result does not indicate
that there are 9810 pure customers that are potential victims
(actually, this does not make sense because there are only
6603 pure customers in the topology). In fact, for a given
pair of intermediate nodes, we can identify 2.5330 common
gateways and 2.3557 common victims on average. An
implication of this information is that if an attacker could
compromise routers in an intermediate node and a gateway,
2.3557 ASes on average would be under the influence of
the attacker.
The number of potential victims are 3854 out of 6603
multi-homed pure customers. To get this result, we count
all victims in 9810 occurrences of the example topology
only once. However, it is important to consider the number
of outgoing connections of the intermediate nodes together
with the number of potential victims in order to see if the
attack scheme actually has an impact. As we discuss in
Section 4.2.3, the attack has much weaker or no impact
if there are extra outgoing connections to the rest of the
Internet among the intermediate nodes. Thus we count the
number of “extra” outgoing connections of each intermediate
node excluding connections through the common gateways.
Figure 6 shows the distribution. As the distribution shows,
it is heavy-tailed; most of the intermediate nodes have few
extra connections. Specifically, 111 intermediate nodes out
of 916 intermediate nodes in total have no extra connection
to the rest of the Internet. 224 intermediate nodes have only
one extra connection and 144 intermediate nodes have two
extra connections. 63.3% of all intermediate nodes have less
than 3 extra connections and 90.72% of all intermediate
nodes have less than 10 extra connections. This result
tells us that if an attacker who already compromised an
intermediate node and a gateway only needs to compromise
a few more routers to attack a victim effectively. Figure
5 shows how this attack can be accomplished. It gives
us a more comprehensive view of the attack scheme. In
the figure, two common gateways and victims exist for a
given pair of intermediate nodes (as discussed before, there
are 2.5330 common gateways and 2.3557 common victims
on average). Also, intermediate node 1 has an outgoing
connection to the Internet. In this case, an attacker needs
to compromise 4 points to be able to attack both victims.
In summary, there are many instances of the example
topology and the intermediate nodes in those instances only
have few extra connections to the rest of the Internet. Thus,
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Figure 5: A More Comprehensive View
an attacker needs to compromise a few more routers to
achieve his goal. In addition, it is possible for an attacker
to attack multiple ASes at the same time with the same set
of compromised routers.
5 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We compare the network performance before and after attack,
so as to evaluate any effect caused by our attack methods,
using simulation. Afterwards, we verify whether this attack
indeed succeeds in redirecting the traffic by observing any
change of routing tables.
5.1 Traffic Comparison
We evaluate the effect of the attack by comparing the incom-
ing traffic load before and after the attack. BGP model in
SSFNet (Cowie et al. 1999) on the simple example topol-
ogy (Figure 1) is used as the comparison baseline. We
assume that the delay and the data rate of normal links are
set to 0.2s and 2Gbps, while those of backup links are set
to 0.5s and 100Mbps, respectively. Figure 7 shows that
the average transfer rate decreases almost linearly as the
traffic passing through the gateway increases. When the
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Figure 7: Comparison of Incoming Traffic Load
age transfer rate decreases by 22.18%. When the gateway
is responsible for 90% of the whole traffic, average transfer
rate decreases by 47.63%. This result indicates that our
attack can be effective when a victim is peripherally located
and the providers of the victim are linked with a single large
ISP network. We showed that this condition is met fairly
often, by analyzing the AS-level partial topology.
5.2 Attack Verification
The attack against padding technique is reproduced in a
simulation environment for verification. We use a BGP
implementation for the ns-2 (McCanne and Floyd 1997)
simulator, called BGP++ (Dimitropoulos and Riley 2003).
For the attack, we recreate the generalized sample topology
(Figure 2) as follows: ASes 1, 2 and 5 have 4 BGP routers,
ASes 3, 6 and 7 have 3 BGP routers, AS 4 has 2 BGP
routers and AS 8 one. Routers within an AS are connected
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in a full-mesh topology, as required by RFC 1771. The
delay and the data rate of all links are set to 10ms and
10Mbps, respectively. The victim AS 8, is originating
the prefix 8.0.0.0/24. One of the two routers in AS 4 is
considered compromised. We configure the latter to make a
false announcement to AS 1, conveying that it originates the
prefix 8.0.0.0/24 at the simulation second t . After running
the simulation we observe that after the t second the routers
of AS 1, 2 and 3 switch to using the spurious path, in which
AS 4 appears as originator of the 8.0.0.0/24 prefix. This is
shown in Figure 8(a) that depicts a snapshot of the routing
table of a router in AS 1 before t , and Figure 8(b) that
depicts a snapshot of the same routing table after t .
6 CONCLUSIONS
We have presented attack mechanisms that can redirect both
incoming and outgoing traffic to the paths that the attackers
specify. By compromising appropriate BGP routers, the
attacker can disable the traffic engineering of a specific
AS, regardless of its configuration settings. Even though
the effectiveness of this attack depends on the topology,
we showed that there are fairly many instances in the AS-
level topology where our methods can successfully attack a
victim. The experiments indicate that our attack scheme can
be successfully exploited by propagating the false topology,
and that it can also degrade the network performance of a
victim.
This paper does not address the potential global impact
that the proposed attack can generate. To examine how many
ASes an attack has to compromise in order to degrade the
global network performance is an interesting problem. Our
future work also includes exploring the possibilities that the
BGP attack can generally cause damage on the Internet.
Considering that even a misconfiguration could cause a
crash of large networks, we believe that malicious attacks
can make more severe impact. In that sense, developing
such an attack method and estimating the possible effect
by large-scale simulation will remain as a valuable future
work.
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